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“My advice is to go for the messes—that’s where 
the action is.”—Steven Weinberg [1]
A
cademic medicine has tried 
to avoid the mess that has 
characterised much of clinical 
practice over the last quarter century. 
Instead its success has come from using 
techniques developed in biochemistry 
and molecular genetics, and applying 
them to disease. It has been a highly 
productive approach. For example, 
identiﬁ  cation of the clinical syndrome 
AIDS, isolation of the causative agent, 
and development of diagnostic testing 
and effective therapy all happened in 
the space of a few years. Alongside such 
successes has come a redeﬁ  nition of 
academic medicine. Medical research 
has become biomedical research; 
discovery ﬂ  ows from bench to bedside 
and if it stutters, an injection of 
funds for more effective translation is 
required [2]. A plethora of organisms 
are sequenced, and all the genes in the 
mouse are to be “knocked out” [3]—all 
to serve the goal of improving human 
health, so we are told. 
Even the idea of clinical disciplines 
appears slightly passé, their 
traditional names a throwback to 
a less scientiﬁ  c age—dermatology 
is now dermatological science, and 
neurology and psychiatry are now 
clinical neuroscience [4]. And if you 
are tempted at the end of the clinic—
before you return to the sanctuary of 
the lab—to wonder about the mess 
of clinical medicine, to ask how it all 
ﬁ  ts together, and to question the real 
outcomes of what you do, you run the 
risk of being put down. The put down 
goes like this: we do science; we do 
not question whether “Coke is better 
than Pepsi or approach A is better than 
approach B” [5]; we leave such choices 
to the consumer and the HMOs to 
decide upon. Back to the 
mice, and future tenure.
Clinical Medicine: 
The Missing Subject
A striking aspect of 
the modern medical 
research university is 
the relative absence of 
clinical medicine from 
its portfolio of activities. 
Just look at what our 
successors are being 
encouraged to study. 
Most students will spend 
three or more years 
studying subjects such 
as cell biology, genetics, 
stem cell biology, or 
biochemistry, with a 
small remnant learning 
some clinical epidemiology and trials 
methodology. Now take yourself back 
to the clinic, spend a week seeing 
patients, and ask what academic 
establishment is needed to improve 
health care? Well, of course, some cell 
biology and the like are needed, but I 
suggest such disciplines should account 
for only 20% of our effort. 
The rest of our effort should be 
directed towards operations research; 
the basis of expertise and decision-
making processes; informatics, from the 
mundane issue of paper versus digital 
clinical records to the representation 
of clinical information in ways that are 
helpful for both doctor and patient; 
health-care policy, determining why 
effective therapies are so often not 
available, and why some diseases are 
researched more than others; and 
psychology, determining why patients’ 
worldviews are so often different from 
ours and whether cognitive limitations 
(by either health professionals or 
patients) can account for some of these 
differences. Underpinning all of this 
should be the basic medical sciences: 
economics, statistics, and physiology.
Academic Kudos Versus 
Improving Health
So why are our institutions not ﬁ  t for 
the purpose of improving patients’ 
health? Herbert Simon, the polymath 
and Nobel laureate in economics, 
observed many years ago that medical 
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schools resembled schools of molecular 
biology rather than of medicine [6]. He 
drew parallels with what had happened 
to business schools. The art and science 
of design, be it of companies or health 
care, or even the type of design that 
we call engineering, lost out to the 
kudos of pure science. Producing an 
economics paper densely laden with 
mathematical symbols, with its patently 
mistaken assumptions about rational 
man, was a more secure way to gain 
tenure than studying the mess of how 
real people make decisions. 
The same problem also applies to 
medicine.  Flushed with success from 
the golden age of medical discovery, 
a marriage was brokered between 
a simple and mistaken model of 
medical discovery in which there was 
a unidirectional ﬂ  ow of information 
from bench to clinic, and the safety 
and control afforded by the technical 
facility of modern biology. Once in 
place, the forces needed to sustain this 
ill-judged union were not difﬁ  cult to 
recognise. 
Most medical researchers rarely, 
if ever, see patients. Most who argue 
for the necessity of the pyramid of 
discovery, with biochemistry and 
genetics at the base and clinical 
research at the apex, work at the base 
themselves [2]. However, many of 
the major discoveries that have had a 
direct impact on clinical practice arose 
from clinical disciplines rather than 
from generic biomedical approaches—
consider hip replacements, cataract 
surgery, the importance of Helicobacter 
pylori, phototherapy, in vitro 
fertilisation, and minimally invasive 
surgery [4]. In the biomedical model, 
these successes are brushed aside as 
being of historical interest only. From 
ﬁ  nding genes to gene therapy and 
stem cell therapy, both the public 
and research community itself are fed 
a biased view of medical advances. 
Cancer cured (in mice) again. 
Medicine: A Science of the Artiﬁ  cial
A number of arguments suggest 
that the conventional wisdom that 
has underpinned the institutions 
of academic medicine is breaking 
down. First, the pace of major 
clinical advance, despite increases 
in funding, is slowing [2]. Second, 
there is increased external scrutiny 
(from many sources) of medicine, not 
least because of the large increases 
in the cost of health care. Third, and 
a useful indicator that something is 
amiss, a career in academic medicine 
is increasingly unattractive—the new 
generation of students clearly see the 
academic towers as ill suited to solving 
the problems that they experience in 
the clinic. 
The Two Epistemologies That 
Underpin Clinical Advance 
There have been two intellectual 
movements in the last half century 
inﬂ  uencing medical practice. The 
ﬁ  rst—the enormous evolution of 
technological facility in biochemistry 
and genetics—needs little comment 
as its inﬂ  uence is all around. The 
second, still inchoate, is the attempt to 
elucidate the laws that govern clinical 
practice. It is to the great credit of the 
clinical epidemiology movement that 
it focussed attention once again on 
how medicine was practiced. No longer 
was medicine just the application of 
theories developed in the laboratory, 
but there was the glimmering of an 
intellectually coherent discipline 
centred on diagnosis and intervention. 
When seen alongside the now classical 
work of Wennberg, showing the 
remarkable variation in the delivery 
of health care across populations 
[7], medicine could be seen in a new 
light. No longer was medicine a mere 
application of “basic” science, of lessons 
from physiology, but, instead, medicine 
was an artefact of engineering—health 
and medical care was something we 
build, something we design. Just as 
informatics and computing are not 
solely about building faster chips, but 
about how information is ordered and 
represented, and how machines and 
humans interact; the same is true for 
medicine. To use Herbert Simon’s 
phrase, medicine is a “science of 
the artiﬁ  cial”, artiﬁ  cial as in artiﬁ  cial 
intelligence: an artefact or something 
created for a purpose [6]. 
The Codiﬁ  cation of Medicine: 
Bringing Order to the Mess
The principal intellectual question of 
the next quarter century for academic 
medicine is to what extent medicine 
is capable of codiﬁ  cation. How and to 
what degree can we codify—produce 
rules—of how decisions in medicine 
should be made. The march of 
industrial progress for the last 200 
years has been the replacement of 
implicit knowledge and experience by 
formal teaching, rule-based behaviour, 
specialisation, and the division of 
labour. How will the mess that is 
clinical practice be ordered by this new 
epistemology? 
How do the results of clinical trials 
inform the therapy of an individual 
patient? Despite the views of many, 
how to interpret numerical data 
as evidence to guide action in a 
particular case has troubled the 
greatest mathematicians for centuries 
[8]. How do we assimilate information 
of different kinds? What is the 
relative proportion of local factors 
versus summary measures in the 
treatment of a patient? The answers 
are not clear. Trials are expensive, 
infrequent, and remote from much 
of clinical care. Often the debate 
seems to resemble some medieval 
battle, with artillery and army being 
towed into place to siege a recalcitrant 
city—think, for example, of the 
intense debate surrounding the value 
of mammography [9]. By contrast, 
clinical practice seems to resemble 
more guerrilla warfare, where the 
lie of the local terrain trumps any 
ﬁ  ckle general predictions. The set of 
statistical techniques developed for use 
in agriculture by the great R. A. Fisher 
and others hardly seems appropriate 
for the questions we wish to address 
[10]. Populist ideas about evidence, 
and the weight of evidence—the 
pseudoscience that adorns so many 
guidelines—is almost too embarrassing 
to mention. 
I mentioned the issue of cost with 
good reason. We have gotten used 
to pretending that cost is not an 
issue when new treatments are being 
researched. Medicine is as much 
engineering as science, and what 
needs to be rewarded in medical 
research is the ability to innovate 
within a ﬁ  nancial envelope. Being able 
to invent solutions at an affordable 
price is a design constraint:  one that 
needs to be seen as a challenge. The 
solution “at any price” is lazy: cheap 
PCs are what made the World Wide 
Web so revolutionary. 
Most medical 
researchers rarely, 
if ever, see patients.
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Conclusion: Coke Versus 
Pepsi Revisited
Codiﬁ  cation reminds us that 
medicine makes heavy demands on its 
practitioners, demands that in all too 
many cases can be usefully mitigated 
with appropriate information systems. 
Here the question is how we can design 
systems that record clinical information 
in a way that facilitates direct clinical 
care, and feeds back and informs 
clinical discovery. The danger is to 
believe that such an advance is not an 
intellectual problem, but just a mere 
choice of which brand of software 
to use for clinical records. There 
is no greater example of academic 
medicine’s hubris than imagining 
that designing medical practice is like 
choosing between “Coke or Pepsi” 
[5]. It is like saying Tim Berners Lee’s 
invention of the World Wide Web 
was on a par with inventing another 
typeface.  
This is the ﬁ  rst in a series of articles in PLoS 
Medicine looking critically at the future of 
academic medicine. 
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